The Reward-Entitlement Argument

The final Lockean argument concerning the origins of private property is the reward-entitlement argument. This argument is based on the idea that we deserve to receive what we reasonably expect to be the rewards of our labour.

Locke writes that “He...ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another’s Labour”, as to do so would betray a desire for the “benefit of another’s Pains”, which “he had no right to”. This appears to be the same as the second argument. Someone has produced value in an object, and to attempt to use that object is to misappropriate that added value.

The emphasis, though, is different here. In talking of the “benefit of another’s Pains” Locke alludes to the purposive nature of labour. We work in order to achieve something, not simply for the joy of working. Work itself is a pain. To deny us the product of our labour is then unjust. Without the expectation of benefits, we would not have undertaken the work in the first place. We have a reasonable expectation of reward at the end of our endeavours, and this entitles us to such a reward on completion of our work.

Presumably the force of this argument in individual cases will be proportional to the expectations of the labourer and the unpleasant nature of the work. If a labourer expects nothing, or finds his work sufficiently enjoyable, the reward-entitlement argument won’t support any claims he might make.