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Political Philosophy / Property Rights / Original Acquisition / The Labour-Mixing Argument

Political Philosophy
Property Rights
Freedom
Punishment

Property Rights
Original Acquisition
Just Distribution

Original Acquisition
Labour-Mixing Argument
Added-Value Argument
Reward- Entitlement Argument
The Lockean Proviso

The Labour-Mixing Argument

John Locke’s solution to the problem of how property rights can arise in the state of nature is that one acquires private property by mixing one’s labour with it. Our labour is our own, and by mixing that labour with something that is unowned, e.g. by ploughing a field, or carving a piece of wood into a statue, we inextricably link our labour with the object. Someone else who then used that object would at the same time use our labour, infringing upon our property rights. By annexing our labour to the object, therefore, we restrict others’ right to use it, making it our own.

Locke’s argument begins with the principle that property rights entitle the owner to whatever the property produces. If an apple tree is mine, for example, then the apples that it produces are mine too. This entitlement includes the right to exclude others from using the property; no one may eat the apples without my permission. This simple principle provides Locke with the leverage that he needs to get the labour-mixing argument off the ground.

A person has property rights over his body. Even if nothing else in the world is owned, our bodies are our own. Applying Locke’s principle, we can infer from this that our labour is also our own. Property rights entitle the owner to whatever the property produces. Our labour is produced by our bodies, and so if our bodies are our own then our labour is our own too. These property rights over our labour include the right to exclude other from using our labour; no one may make use of my labour without my permission to do so.

When we labour on an object, we mix our labour with the object, and the two become inextricably conjoined. If, for example, we labour on a plot of land, planting an orchard, then anyone who subsequently attempts to use that plot of land will be unable to do so without also using our labour. As they are not entitled to use our labour, and cannot use the land without using our labour, they are no longer entitled to use the land. Our property rights have thus been extended from that which we own, our labour, to that with which our labour has been mixed, the object on which we laboured.